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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
prevent anyone acquited under the new rule from becoming a
menace to society. In the District of Columbia, it would seem that
an accused person who is acquitted by reason of insanity is pre-
sumed insane,48 and may be commited to a hospital for the insane
for an indefinite period. 9 In addition, if the new rule should prove
too broad in practice, presumably the court may define more rigidly
the type of mental disorder that is to be a defense.
The Durham rule brings the law into harmony with prevailing
medical concepts. It provides the psychiatrist with the "fuller hear-
ing by the law" which was asked for recently.5° At last they have
an opportunity to prove to the law that society may be as well, if
not better protected by the "treatment" of the mentally ill offender
as it is by punishing him. When the proof is made it is hoped that
other courts will follow the fine example set for them by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
LESLIE A. KAST.
EVIDENCE-LEGALrIY OF WIIRETAPPING-DIULGENCE IN COURT.-
Long a storm center of legal controversy, the question of wiretap-
ping has more recently been the subject of extensive comment. A
clarification of the admissibility of evidence obtained through wire-
tapping and a workable solution to problems stemming from the
practice of wiretapping are issues of pressing importance. In
medieval times when most criminals were members of a loosely
knit mob without means of speedy communication, society held a
great advantage over them. In the twentieth century, conspiratorial
crime carried on by use of the telephone has made surveillance over
the criminal more difficult. As a counter-balancing power, the
authorities have resorted to wiretapping. This article will attempt
48. See Barry v. White, 64 F.2d 707, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
49. D. C. Code §24-301 (1951) provides: ". . . if an accused person shall be ac-
quitted by the jury on the ground of insanity, the court may certify the fact to the
Federal Security Administrator, who may order such person to be confined in the bos-
pital for the insane, . . .".
50. Zilboorg, op. cit. supra note 14, at 122. The psychiatrist of today finds himself
in great need of a fuller hearing by the law. He has more to say and to reveal about
those who commit crimes than he is allowed to say and reveal. He is eager to convince
the court and the jury that mentally sick criminals deserve an opportunity to live, if
not the opportunity to get well. He wants to convince the court and the jury that our
knowledge as to who is mentally ill, and as to who knows without really knowing, and
as to who acts seemingly rationally but actually not reasonably, has grown to such an
extent during the past fifty or seventy-five years that the law must find ways and means
of admitting the ps chiatrist's views into open court."
NOTES
to give an historical background of the important decisions govern-
ing the practice and examine the present state of the law.
Under the common law, the admissibility of evidence was not
affected by the illegality of means by which it was obtained.1 The
United States Supreme Court, however, has held the admission of
evidence obtained through an unlawful search and seizure violates
the Fourth Amendment. 2 In Olmstead v. United States,3 the first
case to reach the Supreme Court on the precise question of wire-
tap evidence, the court held, five to four, that wiretapping was not
an unreasonable search and seizure. It further stated that since the
witness was not compelled to testify against himself, there was no
violation of the Fifth Amendment. The majority opinion delivered
by Chief Justice Taft, provoked a much quoted dissent by Justices
Brandeis and Holmes. Taft said the Fourth Amendment applied
only to searches of material things, such as the person, his house
or his effects. Wiretapped evidence is obtained only by use of the
sense of hearing; the intervening wires are not part of the house;
hence, there is no physical search or seizure. The dissenting opinion
struck a convincing moral chord in the form of a neatly phrased
query: Will the Court sustain an unethical act by government law
enforcing agents in order to convict?' Answering the question,
Holmes said, "We have to choose and for my part I think it less evil
that some criminals should escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part."5 If Justice Holmes didn't have the Court on
his side he apparently had correctly diagnosed the national pulse.
The Baltimore Sun said editorially a few years later, "There never
has been any doubt that the country agreed with Mr. Justice Holmes
about wiretapping. Mr. Justice Holmes held wiretapping to be a
'dirty business'."' Professor Wigmore, prominent advocate of. ad-
missibility of all pertinent evidence, admits it to be 'dirty business'
but justifies the use of the wiretapped evidence as a necessity.- He
considers the view of Holmes as being an impractical limitation
upon good law enforcement and as a final thrust asks, "Why all the
tenderness for the lawbreaker"? This interrogatory, of course, as-
1. Hitzelbergcr v. State, 174 Md. 152, 197 At. 605, 610 (1938).
2. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886).
3. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
4. See id. at 469 (dissenting opinion).
5. See id. at 470.
6. Baltimore Sun, March 19, 1940.
7. 8 Wigrnore, Evidence §2184b (3d ed., 1940). "Kicking a man in the stomach ts
dirty business, normally viewed. But if a gunman assails you, and you know enough of
the French art of 'savatage' to kick him in the stomach and thus save your life, is that
'dirty business' for you? . . . No, no.").
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sumes that only the rights of wrongdoers will be violated-a de-
batable assumption. It also ignores the nature of private conver-
sation, which is characterized by all sorts of exaggerations and con-
fessions. Everyone has some aspect of his life which he does not
wish exposed through indiscriminate tapping.
From the Olmstead Case until 1934, wiretapped evidence was
admissible in federal courts. In 1934 the Federal Communications
Act ' was passed and once again the debate was re-opened. Section
605 of the Act says in part:
"No person receiving or assisting in receiving, or transmitting,
any interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio shall
divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport,
effect, or meaning thereof, except through authorized channels of
transmission or reception, to any person other than the addressee,
his agent,, or attorney . .. or in response to a subpoena issued
by a court of competent jurisdiction, or on demand of other law-
ful authority; and nq person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such
intercepted communcation to any person; . . .
This section was lifted almost verbatim from the Radio Act of
1927,9 the apparent intent of which was to prevent pirating of
messages by rival communication companies. The government thus
argued that Section 605 had nothing to do with wiretapping; that
the Act of 1934 was for the purpose of re-enacting the Radio Act of
1927.10 Further, several bills specifically outlawing wiretapping had
been rejected by Congress. 1 As will be noted, no mention is made
in Section 605 of the word "wiretapping". However, in Nardone v.
United States, 2 the Supreme Court interpreted Section 605 to pre-
vent admission in federal court of evidence gained by wiretapping.
The words "no person" shall divulge or publish a message to "any
person" is construed -to cover use of such messages in court. In the
second Nardone Case, evidence obtained by use of information de-
rived from wiretapping was also declared inadmissible.13 So called
"leads" gained from wiretapping cannot be utilized by the prosecu-
tion. As a practical matter, this affords little protection to the ac-
8. 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §605 (1946)-hereafter referred to as Sec-
tion 605.
9. 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). (Repealed by the Federal Communications Act of 1934.
See note 8 supra.)
10. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 381 (1937).
11. Note, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 430, 436. (Since the Nardone Case in 1937, there have
been more than thirty bills dealing with wiretappng introduced into Congress.)
12. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
13. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
NOTES
cused because the admission of evidence for conviction obtained as
a result of wiretapping does not vitiate a criminal prosecution if the
government can establish that the evidence had an origin independ-
ent of- wiretapping. 14 Stated another way, the burden of proof is
upon the accused to show to the trial court's satisfaction that' wire-
tapping was unlawfully employed and that a substantial part of the
indictment rests upon such inadmissible evidence. 15 A moment's re-
flection will show that this places the accused under a great handi-
cap. The accused is generally unaware of wiretapping or at least
uncertain about what information the government has acquired.
The burden of proof under these circumstances becomes gravely
difficult to sustain and tends to qualify the force of the exculusion-
ary rule.
Section 605 has been, given a narrow construction so as not to
unduly hamper law enforcement officers. In Goldstein v. United
States,6 the testimony of the accused's co-conspirators was induced
by telling them contents of an intercepted telephone message to
which they were parties but to which accused was not. The testi-
mony so obtained was ruled admissible, in a trial of one not a party
to the message. This construction gives protection only to the-
parties to the intercepted conversation. The dissenting opinion
claimed that Section 605 was an expression of public policy seeking
to protect society at large against the evils of wiretapping, and that
the majority had repudiated Nardone v. United States by deciding
to the contrary.'" In United States v. Lewis,' the court held that
the interception is improper only if made without the consent of
the sender. Where one party consents to tapping there is no viola-
tion of Section 605. It would seem immaterial whether the party
consenting be the sender or receiver. 19 In 1939, the Supreme Court
extended the exclusionary rule to intrastate as well as interstate
cmmunicatins .20
It is important to note that Section 605 does not make inter-
ception, per se, a criminal offense.21 The bare interception must be
14. See Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 756 (D.C. Cir. 1951); United States
v. Reed, 96 F.2d. 785, 786 (2d Cir. 1938).
15. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); United States v. Franfield, 100
F. Supp.'934 (Md. 1951); United States v. Pillion,'36 F. Supp. 567 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
16. 316 U.S. 114 (1941).
17. See id. at 122 (dissenting opinion).
18. 87 F. Supp. 970 (D.D.C. 1950).
19. See discussion of word "sender" in United States v. Pollakoff, 112 F. 2d. 888,
889 (2d Cir. 1940).
20. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
21. See Note, 6 Hastings L. J. 71, 73 (1954).
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coupled with a divulging of the information gained to complete the
offense. 22 There are two elements to the offense: "interception"
and "divulging". The effect of this interpretaton is best seen by
looking at the operations of the Justice Department. On an average
day, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has 150 to 200 taps work-
ing,23 yet the Bureau does not consider itself engaging in illegal acts.
The resulting accumulation of evidence is probably one of the big
reasons why the Justice Department wants legislation making all
prior wiretapped evidence admissible.
24
Thus far we have been dealing exclusvely with wiretapping as
related to federal courts. It is well established that Section 605 does
not apply as a compulsory rule of evidence in state courts.22 The
fact that that wiretapped evidence is inadmissible in federal courts
is simply a factor to be considered by the states in formulating a
rule of evidence relating to its use in state courts. 26 Most state
courts will not inquire into the source of competent evidence and in
this respect they follow closely the common law rule. The Federal
Communications Act is presumed to be limited in effect to federal
jurisdictions and does not supersede a state's exercise of its police
power in the absence of a clear manifestation to the contrary.
27
One possible reason that state courts have refused to follow the fed-
eral rule is that there has always remained some doubt as to just
what Congress intended to do about the problem of wiretapping.
Every time Congress has been directly confronted with the prob-
lem it has refused to act. 8 In a recent Pennsylvania case, the de-
fendent conceded that Section 605 did not promulgate a rule of
evidence binding upon state courts. 29 However, the defendent
advanced the theory that the common law rule that the admissi-
bility of evidence is not affected by its source had no relevancy
because it was propriety of divulging of the information, in court
and not the prior unlawful obtaining of it that was involved. As a
22. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); See Coplon v. United States,
191 F. 24 749, 759. (Section 605 does not make wiretapping an offense but does con-
clemn as criminal the interception and disclosure of the contents of the message, both
,acts being essential to complete the offense.)
23. Time Magazine, Jan. 4, 1954, p. 23, col. 1.
24. See Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 832
and H.R. 8649, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 114 (1954). (At page 228, the Attorney General
expresses an opinion that legalizing admissibility of evidence intercepted prior to enact-
ment af pending bills ,%sould not result in an ex post facto law.)
25. People v. Channell, 107 Cal.2d 192, 236 P. 2d 554 (1951); Hubin v. State,
180 Md. 279, 23 A.2d. 706 (1942).
26. See Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 201 (1952).
27. See MeGuire v. State, 200 Md. 601, 92 A.2d 582, 584 (1952).
28. See Note, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 430, 436 et seq. (1954).
29. See Commonwealth v. Chaitt, 176 Pa. 318, 107 A.2d 214, 220 (1954).
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result, it was argued, the state court, by permitting wiretapped
testimony, actually participates in an act which is made a crime by
federal statute. This theory required the assumption that it was a
crime to testify in a state court concerning conversation overheard
on a tapped wire. There are apparently no cases upholding this
view. There is, however, among writers, some isolated support for
applying the principle of Section 605 to the state courts.3" A mere
reading of the section would appear to reveal no logical distinction
made between federal and state courts in the language of the
statute; nevertheless, state courts have made this distinction and
have been upheld by the Supreme Court.31
Aside from any consideration of the Federal Communication Act
of 1934, a similar problem of interpretation arises regarding state
statutes. Among the states there are many types of laws regarding
the use of communication facilities. It is a complex picture and
follows no pattern. Some forbid wiretapping only in the most gen-
eral terms while others have wiretap statutes dealing solely with
telegraph companies. 32 A majority of states, although limiting to
some extent the tapping of wires, do not prohibit the admission in
evidence of information obtained in violation of their laws.33 A
minority of states prohibit both the tapping of wires and the ad-
mission of illegally obtained evidence.3" All of these statutes are
subject to varying interpretations and since cases construing them
have been infrequent, the status of wiretapped evidence in a major-
ity of states remains uncertain.
North Dakota has a statute prohibiting only unlawful intercep-
tion of messages.3 5 Nothing is said as to use of such messages in
court. While there apparently have been no reported cases decid-
30. Bernstein, "Civil Liberties and Wire Taps", 37 Ill. L. Rev. 99, 108 (1942).
31. People v. Kelley, 22 Cal.2d 169, 137 P. 2d 1 (1943), cert denied, 320 U.S. 715
(1943). (Attorney General of California took the position that the Federal Communica-
tions Act is a rule of evidence concerning federal officers and federal courts and does
not prohibit the admission in a state court of evidence obtained by state officers. The
court held that wiretapped evidence is admissible in California courts.)
32. See Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary ont S. 332
and H.R. 8649, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 230 (1954).
33. Hearings, supra note 32, at 230. (Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Con-
necticut, Delaware, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, and Virginia.)
34. Ibid. (Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Montana, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and
Wyoming.)
35. N. D. Rev. Code §8-1007 (1943): "Every person who, willfully or fraudulent-
ly . . . makes any connection with or cuts, breaks, or taps in any unauthorized manner
any telegraph or telephone line, wire or cable . . . reads or copies by the use of tele-
graph or telephone instruments . . . aids, employs, agrees or conspires with any other
person to do any of such acts . . . is guilty of a felony . ..
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ing the point, the assumption is that wiretapped evidence would be
admissible in our state courts.36 A careful reading of the statute to-
gether with the prevailing attitude of other states, would indicate
North Dakota does not follow the federal rule.
CONCLUSION
The right of privacy has always been high on the list of civil
liberties to be protected. It is the very essence of the Fourth
Amendment. Free exchange of conversation without fear of re-
prisal is an important adjunct to the right of privacy. This right of
privacy, an oft-repeated yet vague term, is, of course, not absolute.
Under present international conditions it is imperative that crim-
inals threatening national security be detected and prosecuted. It is
no less important that constitutional rights be protected. Some-
where between these two conflicting views a balance must be
struck. The Justice Department has long sought to force a change
in the law. Attorney General Brownell touched off a new con-
troversy in 1954 when he said, "[it is] ...absurd to let spies go
unwhipped of justice behind that shield . . . [of non-admissi-
bility] ".7 Mr. Brownell views the federal rule as defined in Section
605 as a glaring loophole that should be closed by appropriate legis-
lation so that those guilty of espionage and related offenses will no
longer be able to escape punishment.
Despite Section 605, it is a recognized fact that wiretapping is
extensively used by the Justice Department. The view of the De-
partment presently is this: 1) the Federal Communi'cation Act of
1934 prohibits interception only when coupled with divulgence, and
2) communication of the contents of a tap by one government agent
to another agent is not divulgence within the meaning of Section
605.38 This rather strained interpretation has the practical effect of
making wiretapping legal for federal agents since no conduct
deemed legal by the Department is going to be prosecuted. How-
ever, the Department realizes that the contents of their intercepted
messages will never be admittd in federal courts under present
rulings; thus the urgency for a change. Congress has been consid-
ering several proposals. 9 The objectives hoped to be achieved
would seem to be:
36. See Note, 33 Cornell L. Q. 73 (1948).
37. See note 23 supra.
38. Hearings, supra note 32, at 239.
39. Id. at 245.
NOTES
1) To permit the government in cases involving national security
to use wiretapped evidence in court.
2) To criminally punish all other unauthorized usage;
3) To place authority in the court system to authorize taps; and
4) To make wiretapped evidence presently on file admissible.
Of these four objectives, only the first meets with the unqualified
approval of both Congress and the Justice Department. These ob-
jectives would clarify the status of wiretapping, ending all executive
and judicial speculation over the rather mysterious Section 605.
While law enforcement agencies would be the chief benefactors
under proposed changes in the law, oddly enough such changes do
not meet with complete approval within their ranks.4 0 Everyone at
least pays lip service to the disirability of limitations that should
accompany any wiretap authorization under proposed legislation.
The limitations range from those permitting almost indiscriminate
tapping (once a court order is obtained) to more stringent restrict-
ions as to time, place, and persons. The purpose which wiretapping
is to serve is the pivotal question to be considered. A recent case in
New York, where wiretapping can be authorized at the court's dis-
cretion, contained some profound words on this subject.4 1 Noting
that permission to tap had been given in the past as a matter of
course, the court said, "A telephone interception is a far more de-
vastating measure than any search warrant... it is a direct assault
on liberty and differs in no substantial sense from stationing a police
officer at the elbow of the person using the telephone. .. " .2
As yet we need not live under the assumption that every sound
is overheard and every move scrutinized. Support of unlimited
wiretapping and its more or less free admissibility is a Step in that
direction. To be sure, those advocating a relaxing of the law can
make a certain case for their side. But, in essence the same case
can be made for giving law enforcement officers the right to inter-
cept private correspondence or even to dispense with search war-
rants. When the matter is put in these terms, the case for unlimited
wiretapping falls apart. It seems apparent that a legislative change
is needed in the present law as it has been interpreted, but only to
this extent- that wiretapped evidence of activities directly harmful
40. See Note, 53 Harv. L. R. 863, 870. (Thomas Dewey, then District Attorney of
New York said ". . . one of the best methods available for uprooting certain types of
crime." On the other hand, J. Edgar Hoover, F. B. I. chief, said in a letter of-Feb. 9, 1940,
- archaic and inefficient practice which has proved a definite handicap . . . in the de-
velopment of sound investigative, technique".)
41. In re Anqnymous, 23.U; S. L. Week 2338, N. Y. -Sup. Ct., Jan 10, 1955.
42. Ibid.
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to national security should be readily admissible in federal courts.
The importance of national survival needs no elaboration. With
this exception, the Nardone Case represents not only good law but
good policy. The evils which free admissibility would correct
(i.e. the escape of criminals) would be overbalanced by new evils
resulting from encroachment upon individual privacy. As observed
in the dissenting opinion of the Goldstein Case, every reasonable
prohibition calculated to destroy the menace of wiretappng should
be ndopted, even though some criminals escape.
JAMES H. O'KEEFE.
TORTS-INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS-INCLUD-
INc BREACH OF CoNTRAcT.-In the year 1853 one Lumley entered
into a contract with one Johanna Wagner who agreed to perform
for a certain term at Lumley's theatre and not to sing or use her
talents elsewhere without Lumley's consent. Before the time of per-
formance one Gye induced Miss Wagner to breach her contract of
which he had knowledge. Lumley brought an action in tort against
Gye alleging these facts and praying for the special damages which
he had suffered. The defendant Gye demurred to the complaint
but the English court overruled the plea and entered judgment for
the plaintiff saying: "He who maliciously procures a damage to
another by violation of his right ought to' be made to indemnify;
and that, whether he procures an actionable wrong or a breach of
contract."' Thus was born the "doctrine of Lumley v. Gye", set-
ting forth in definitive form the tort of inducing breach of contract,
2
which has since been accepted in England3 and in the vast majority
of jurisdictions in the* United States.
4
Originally the action appeared as a remedy available to the
Roman pater-familias for damages sustained by him due to violence
committed on his family or slaves. England eventually adopted this
type of action as a part of the common law, and in 1350 when the
Black Death left a great shortage of labor, created an additional
remedy by instituting the Statute of Labourers. Under that act a
penalty was provided to prevent a laborer from running away, and
1. 2 El. & BI. 216 (Q.B. 1853).
2. See Prosser, Torts 977 (1941).
3. See, e.g., Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q.B.D. 333, 50 L.J.Q.B. 305 (1881).
4. See Prosser, supra note 2, at 979.
